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The Statutory Commander in Chief
NEIL KINKOPF*

INTRODUCTION

This symposium asks us to consider the scope and limits of presidential power in
the context of war and terrorism. This question strongly suggests a constitutional
focus.' Because the Constitution establishes the presidential office and sets forth its
powers and duties, it is the appropriate starting point for considering this question. The
Constitution alone, however, does not get us very far. A wide range of statutes bear on
the President's power in this realm and serve to define the extent and limits of his
power. As a practical matter, then, the question of presidential power in the context of
war and terrorism is one of statutory interpretation. Recognizing the centrality of
statutory interpretation in this crucial area, a number of scholars have turned their
attention to this question. From their writings, a consensus appears to be emerging on
some important foundational points. First, these scholars claim that the President is
entitled to deference. Second, where assertions of presidential power implicate
individual constitutional rights, these scholars claim that the President's assertion must
be founded on a statute that includes a clear statement of authority.
In this Article, I challenge both aspects of the emerging consensus. Each aspect
unjustifiably privileges some constitutional values over others. Instead, I advocate an
approach to statutory interpretation-grounded in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube-that seeks to effectuate all relevant constitutional values
and to vindicate the underlying constitutional structure of power. In Part I, I will
examine the underlying constitutional framework for understanding the scope of
executive power. In Part II, I will examine and critique the emerging consensus that
advocates both deference to the President and the protection of individual rights
through a clear statement rule. Finally, in Part III, I will offer a prescription for how to
conduct statutory interpretation in a way that is faithful to constitutional values.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The first constitutional question one must ask when interpreting the extent of
presidential power over military and foreign affairs is how to read the Constitution's
allocation of powers between the President and Congress. There are two possible

* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank
Dawn Johnsen for her outstanding efforts in planning this symposium. I would also like to thank
Dean Lauren Robel for being such a gracious host. In preparing this paper, I have benefited
tremendously from the comments of David Barron, Louis Fisher, Dawn Johnsen, Marty
Lederman, Sai Prakash, Jeff Powell, Chris Schroeder, Eric Segall, Patrick Wiseman, and the
participants at a faculty colloquium hosted by the Indiana University School of Law.
1. The President's constitutional authority has been the nearly exclusive focus of the
leading academic literature. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993); Louis
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1990); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE

PRESIDENT'S AuTHoRrrY OvER FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2002); JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND
PEACE (2005).
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approaches: one focuses on the way the Constitution divides power among the
branches and reads those powers as separate and distinct-call this the exclusivity
model; the other focuses on the way the Constitution contemplates that power will be
shared among the branches-the reciprocity model. For example, the Constitution
grants the President some powers relating to war-notably the commander-in-chief
power-and grants others to Congress, such as the power to make rules for the
regulation and government of the land and naval forces. The exclusivity view reads
these as separate and distinct powers, which means that Congress may not make rules
and regulations that burden the President's ability to act as commander in chief. The
reciprocity model views these powers as components of a shared war power. The
Constitution, on this view, means for the President and Congress each to wield aspects
of the war power, which means that the powers should be understood in a way that
accommodates the exercise of each and recognizes that they overlap and interrelate.
While debate over these competing conceptions stretches back to our early
constitutional history, 2 the reciprocity model has come to be accepted as the
appropriate way to approach questions of power. 3 The model has its most famous
articulation in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube.4
"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
5
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.
The reciprocity model follows from James Madison's formulation of the principle
of separation of powers. Those opposing the ratification of the Constitution argued that
the document mingled powers among the President and Congress, thus violating the
principle. Madison rejoined that this objection misapprehends the separation of powers
principle. The separation of powers principle does not forbid the blending of power
between the branches:
[Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own
words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye,
can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.6

2.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS

(1845).
3. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (specifically adopting Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown as the appropriate framework for resolving controversies about the scope of
presidential power).
4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice
Jackson's formulation recognizes that there may be instances in which the Constitution actually
grants a power exclusively to one branch, but this possibility appears to apply to only a very
small set of circumstances. Id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 635.
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), at 338 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
(emphasis in original).
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Nevertheless, the exclusivity model occasionally rears its head. Most notoriously,
the Department of Justice employed this model in its original Torture Memo. 7 In that
memorandum, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opined that the anti-torture statute
could not prohibit the President from ordering the use of torture in interrogations of
enemy combatants, because such a prohibition would violate the President's
constitutional powers. OLC opined that the Constitution assigns the war power to the
President. 8 It failed even to cite to Justice Jackson's seminal opinion from Youngstown.
This is no mere violation of citation etiquette, for it led OLC to fail to acknowledge
that Congress has any relevant authority whatsoever. Had OLC employed Justice
Jackson's framework, OLC would have been unable to avoid recognizing Congress's
relevant powers, including the power to make rules to govern the military and to define
and punish violations of the law of war. As there is no plausible interpretation that
these powers are irrelevant to the validity of the prohibition on torture, the application
of the correct interpretive model-reciprocity rather than exclusivity-has decisive
significance.
Despite the apparent resolution in favor of the reciprocity model, OLC has
continued to apply the exclusivity model. Although the Department of Justice
eventually withdrew the Torture Memo, 9 OLC continues to invest the dispute with
significance by following the exclusivity model. The memorandum withdrawing the
Torture Memo rescinds the section dealing with the President's commander-in-chief
power only because it regards the discussion to have been unnecessary.' 0 The
withdrawing memo, however, does not repudiate or even question the substance of the
Torture Memo's reasoning on the issue of presidential power. Moreover,
contemporaneous OLC opinions-which have been neither repudiated nor
withdrawn--continue to employ the exclusive approach to presidential power.
The continuing salience of the controversy over how to construe the President's
powers relating to foreign and military affairs has been most recently highlighted in the
debate over the legal validity of President Bush's domestic surveillance program. The
particulars of the program remain secret, but the broad parameters pose the issues quite
starkly. The President has authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to engage in
domestic surveillance by wire-tapping communications between persons within the
United States (including, but not limited to, United States citizens) and persons outside
the United States where one party to the communication is "linked to al Qaeda or
related terrorist organizations."" The Justice Department has taken the position that

7. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R.
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Torture Memo], available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationnemo202080l .pdf.
8. Id. OLC appears to rest this conclusion mainly on an arguably tendentious reading of
the inapposite FederalistNo. 23. See FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (dealing with
the division of war and foreign affairs powers between the federal government and the state
governments and without addressing the allocation of power within the federal government).
9. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to James Corney, Deputy Att'y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
10. Id. at 2.
11.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE AcTwrrrIEs OF THE

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRI3ED BY THE PRESIDENT 1 (2006), 81 IND. L.J. 1374
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the President has "inherent constitutional
authority" to engage in surveillance designed
2
to protect national security.'
This much is, or should be, uncontroversial. It is widely accepted that the President
holds a protective power13 to respond to emergencies that threaten national security.
What is controversial is the claim that this power is exclusive and not subject to
regulation or limitation. This assertion was the foundation of the Torture Memo' 4 and
underlies the Justice Department's defense of the domestic surveillance program.
The domestic surveillance program directly implicates the controversy over the
nature of the President's inherent constitutional powers because it runs afoul of a
specific statutory prohibition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA
is a comprehensive regulation of electronic surveillance within the United States. FISA
requires that the government acquire a warrant from a special court (the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court) before undertaking any electronic surveillance within
the United States. I5 By the terms of the act, FISA is the "exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance... may be conducted."' 16 FISA sets forth several categories of
exception to the warrant requirement, and the nature of these exceptions underscores
FISA's comprehensive scope. For example, FISA specifically addresses itself to the
context of wartime surveillance, authorizing warrantless searches for a fifteen-day
period after war is declared.17 Moreover, FISA provides that in an emergency situation,
surveillance may commence before a warrant is obtained, as long as a warrant
8
application is made within seventy-two hours after surveillance is initiated.1
If the President's inherent authority to engage in national security surveillance is
exclusive, in that it is not susceptible to statutory regulation, then FISA is
unconstitutional in requiring that such surveillance be conducted only pursuant to a
warrant. If, on the other hand, the President's inherent power is not exclusive, Congress
retains power to impose regulations that apply to the President's exercise of his
authority. Here, Congress has authority to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate
and foreign commerce, which paradigmatically include lines of communication such as
cell phones, telephones, and email. 19 Moreover, the agencies that the President would
deploy to conduct the surveillance are created and structured by Congress pursuant to
its substantive powers generally under Article I, Section 8, and especially under the
[hereinafter DOJ whitepaper]. The program was first disclosed by a report in the New York
Times. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on CallersWithout Courts, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2005, at A5.The President acknowledged the existence of the program in a
press conference held on December 19, 2005. The extent of the program is detailed in JAMES
RIsEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF TE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 44-49
(2006).
12. DOJ whitepaper, supra note 11, at 6-10, 81 IND. L. J at 1379-83.
13. The classic expression is Henry P. Monaghan, The ProtectivePowerof the Presidency,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1993).
14. See Torture Memo, supra note 7, at 34-39.
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. H 2002).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (Supp. 1112003).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
18. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (Supp. H 2002).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Houston E. & W. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342
(1914); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1(1877); see also 47 U.S.C. §§
151-152 (setting forth the jurisdiction of the FCC).
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Necessary and Proper Clause. 20 Congress is empowered by these authorities to
determine how those agencies will and will not operate. Under a reciprocal
understanding of constitutional power, the appropriate inquiry is suggested by Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer "[w]hen the

President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,
his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.",2 1 The Supreme
Court refined this inquiry in Morrison v. Olson, asking whether the statute in question
"disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches by preventing the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. 22 Given
the secrecy of the NSA surveillance program, it is impossible to offer a definitive
conclusion to this question. Nevertheless, none of the Bush Administration's
burgeoning attempts to defend the program would satisfy the standard. 23
For the most part, the Bush Administration has not been shy about following its
exclusivity theory to the conclusion that Congress is without authority to impose even
seemingly moderate regulations on the ways in which the President exercises power.24

20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

21. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).

22. 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (quoting Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,443
(1977)).
23. The Bush Administration has repeatedly relied on the claim that warrantless
surveillance is imperative because of the need to act quickly. In a speech defending the program,
Attorney General Gonzales cited "necessary speed and agility" as a basis for the program. See
Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Invokes Actions of Other Presidentsin Defense of U.S. Spying, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 25, 2006, at A18. The DOJ whitepaper also quotes President Bush's statement that

"the NSA activities 'enable us to move faster and quicker. And that's important. We've got to be
fast on our feet, quick to detect and prevent. This is an enemy that is quick and it's lethal. And
sometimes we have to move very, very quickly.' FISA by contrast is better suited 'for long-term
monitoring."' DOJ whitepaper, supra note 11, at 5, 81 IND. L. J at 1378 (quoting press
conference of President Bush (Dec. 19, 2005)). Yet none of the Bush Administration's defenses
has substantiated how FISA is ill-suited to rapid response. In particular, the 72-hour period

appears to allow the NSA to begin surveillance "quickly," indeed immediately, and to apply for
a warrant later. While the Administration has offered numerous defenses in speeches, none of
them offers even a hint as to why the 72-hour window does not adequately protect the
President's ability to perform his constitutional role. See, e.g., Remarks on the War on Terror
and a Question-and-Answer Session in Manhattan, Kansas, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 101

(Jan. 23, 2006); Richard Cheney, Vice President, Remarks on Iraq and the War on Terror at the
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (Jan.
19, 2006), available at
http:llwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/ 20060119-5.html; Alberto R. Gonzales,
Attorney General, Address at the Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 24,2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speechesl2006/ ag-speech_0601241.html; Michael Hayden,
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Address at the National Press Club (Jan. 23,
2006), availableat http://www.dni.gov/ release letter_012306.html; Press Briefing by Alberto
Gonzales, Attorney General, and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National
Intelligence,
in
Washington,
D.C.
(Dec.
19,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/ 12/20051219-1.html; Larry King Live:
Interview with Alberto Gonzales (CNN television broadcast Jan. 16, 2006).
24. For example, when President Bush signed the Vision 100-Century of Aviation
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While the Justice Department's whitepaper defending the NSA surveillance program
reaffirms this view, 25 this is not the ground on which it rests the legality of the NSA
surveillance program. Instead, the Justice Department reads a separate statute-the
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) 2 6-as overriding FISA's warrant
requirement. This represents a shift from the Torture Memo and other opinions of the
same vintage, 27 such as the opinion concluding that the Constitution authorizes the
President to initiate war even if Congress has not declared war, in that it does not base
the President's authority on the Constitution alone. Thus, the Justice Department's
questions of constitutional interpretation to
approach has shifted in its emphasis from
2
questions of statutory interpretation. 8
Reauthorization Act, he included in his signing statement four distinct objections to the ways in
which the law would interfere with his authority as the head of the unitary executive branch. See
Statement on Signing the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1795 (Dec. 12, 2003). This included an objection to thd requirement that the administration
provide information to the National Commission on Small Community Air Service. See id. Of
course, not all of the signing statements based on the Bush Administration's theory of executive
power have been quite so prosaic. The President eventually capitulated to congressional
demands and signed the McCain Amendment prohibiting torture as well as cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment of detainees, but issued a signing statement asserting the authority to ignore
this law in the interest of national security. See Statement on Signing the Department of
Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918, 1918-19 (Dec. 30,
2005); Statement on Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2003, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 425 (Mar. 9, 2006). For a general review of the use of
signing statements by the Bush Administration, see Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar
Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of PresidentialSigning Statements, 35 PRS. STUDIES Q. 515
(2005).
25. If the warrant requirement were to apply to the NSA surveillance program, "FISA
would be unconstitutional .... "DOJ whitepaper, supra note 11, at 3, 81 IND. L. J at 1376.
26. The AUMF provides
[t]hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States, by such nations, organizations, or
persons.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Publ. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). This
is the statute that authorizes the ongoing war in Afghanistan, as well as authorizing action
against al Qaeda.
27. Of course, the NSA surveillance program itself was initiated in the same general
timeframe that the Torture Memo was being written. This raises a troubling aspect of the DOJ
whitepaper: it was written approximately four years after the NSA surveillance program was
initiated. It cannot simply memorialize the opinion of the Justice Department at the time the
program was launched, because the whitepaper relies heavily on legal authorities-most
prominently Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)-that post-date the program's origin. It would be highly irregular procedurally if there were no
legal opinion issued at the time the program was initiated, but the existence of such an opinion
is secret and, if such an opinion exists, so is its substance.
28. That said, the Justice Department's insistence that the President's inherent powers are
also exclusive, rather than interstitial and reciprocal, remains crucial. With respect to the NSA
surveillance program, for example, the Justice Department's conclusion that the AUMF
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The controversy over the validity of the NSA surveillance program is typical. Most
questions of presidential power over foreign and military affairs involve statutes,
frequently a complex interaction of several statutes. Issues of the scope and content of
presidential power, then, turn on considerations of statutory construction.
II. THE STATUTORY

CONTEXT

While Justice Jackson's view of the Constitution as establishing an order of shared
and reciprocal powers seems to have prevailed, his framework does not yield definitive
answers to controversies over presidential power. Instead, it serves to structure the
inquiry and to rule out extreme positions. 29 As Justice Jackson himself realized, "any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperative of30events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of the law."
It will be the rare circumstance indeed where Congress has actually been silent. To
be sure, the array of statutes relating to military and foreign affairs is not so elaborate
as that covering domestic affairs. Nevertheless, that array is quite extensive. As Justice
Jackson's above-quoted caution indicates, it is very difficult to say much about these
statutes, and therefore about presidential power, in the abstract. Each statute will
potentially pull in different directions. An authorizing statute, by implication, prohibits
that which is left unauthorized. 31A prohibitory statute, similarly, may imply authority
to do that which is not forbidden. Moreover, it will be common that a presidential
32
action implicates several statutes, which may point in different directions.
In addition to this type of complexity in the statutory regime relating to military and
foreign affairs, statutes in this area will often be critically ambiguous, and unavoidably
so. Especially where a statute means to authorize presidential action, the statute will be
effective only if it allows the President enough leeway to respond to future
overrides FISA's warrant requirement is based on the constitutional avoidance canon, that is,
statutes should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional questions. There is only a serious
constitutional question involved in interpreting FISA to require warrants for the NSA
surveillance program if the exclusivity view is correct. If it is not, then Congress plainly has
authority to impose this operationally very slight procedural safeguard on the executive.
29. The Torture Memo, in asserting that the President may order the torture of enemy
combatants despite an express congressional prohibition, might be defended as conceptualizing
the President's power as one that prevails even within the low ebb of category three. See Eric
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A 'Torture' Memo and Its Tortuous Critics,WALL ST. J., July 6,
2004, at A22. Such a defense would be unpersuasive, however. First, as a descriptive matter, the
Torture Memo never cited Youngstown, nor did it otherwise employ Justice Jackson's
framework. Nothing in the opinion acknowledges Congress's relevant constitutional powerssuch as the power to make rules and regulations to govern the military and the power to legislate
to effectuate treaty obligations-let alone explains why Congress's power cannot encompass the
torture of enemy combatants. Second, there is not even a vaguely colorable argument that
Congress's power is irrelevant to the use of torture to interrogate enemy combatants. In other
words, the Torture Memo does not make this argument, nor could it have.
30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
31. How strongly is often a delicate matter. Compare, e.g., Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579
(finding negative implication) with Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (general
tenor of acceptance).
32. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (implicating the AUMF and the
Non-Detention Act).
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contingencies and diplomatic or military developments as they evolve. For example,
Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to
allow the President to respond to threats that may arise in the future. The President is
authorized to undertake a broad array of economic sanctions, including the seizure of
property against foreign persons, organizations, or nations if the President finds that
there exists an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat.,, 33 While the statute uses modifiers-"unusual and
extraordinary"-to describe the degree of threat that must be found to invoke
presidential power, IEEPA does not define these terms and does not impose rigid
limitations on the President. Instead, the law is drafted so as to allow the President
flexibility in responding to actual circumstances. imilarly, Congress has authorized
the President to "use such means, not amounting o acts of war and not otherwise
prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and lroper to obtain or effectuate the
release" of a United States citizen who is held hostage "by or under the authority of
any foreign government." 34 While this statute imposes some limits-the President may
not engage in war to win the release of a hostage-its evident concern is with
preserving the capacity of the President35to respond effectively to the unforeseeable
exigencies of a particular hostage crisis.
Questions of presidential power, and limits on that power, are fraught with
complexity and ambiguity. Wiser commentators, heeding Justice Jackson's warning,
tend to craft their observations around specific statutes and/or factual settings.3 6 Yet, it
is possible to draw some more general lessons about how to construe the President's
power despite the complexity and ambiguity of the statutory overlay. The lessons are
mostly negative; deference and clear statement rules have at best limited value and
applicability.
An important issue that arises is whether and to what extent deference is owed to the
President's interpretation of his own power. 37 In particular, commentators ask whether
Chevron deference applies to the President.3 s The touchstone for this question is the

33. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1701 (2004) (presidential authority to declare emergency); 50 U.S.C.S. §
1702 (2004) (setting forth permissible sanctions).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000).
35. These statutes, IEEPA, and the so-called Hostage Act, are discussed in Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. 654.
36. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorizationand the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047 (2005) (examining particular questions arising
under the AUMF); Cass R. Sunstein, AdministrativeLaw Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663
(2005); Mark Tushnet, ControllingExecutive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 2673 (2005).
37. The emphasis on this question may be misguided and misleading. See infra notes 14143 and accompanying text. It is misguided in that it focuses on how courts construe presidential
power, where extra-judicial interpretation plays a key role. Outside the judicial ambit, the
justifications for deference have little, and often no, application. It is misleading because such
discussions may lead executive branch interpreters to forego their role of scrutinizing the factual
and legal basis for presidential action.
38. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv.
649 (2000); Sunstein, supra note 36. Chevron deference is essentially a doctrine of judicial
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statute itself. Does the statute purportedly authorizing the President's conduct evince
the intent to accord deference to the President's interpretation? 39 This, of course, will
often be a contentious interpretive question, especially given the unavoidable
ambiguity of statutes in this area. 4° Nevertheless, there is something of a consensus
emerging that Chevron deference is appropriate except where individual rights are at
issue.4' As Professor Sunstein has put it, "Insofar as the AUMF is applied in a context
that involves the constitutional powers of the President, it should be interpreted
generously. In this domain, the President receives the kind of super-strong deference
that derives from the combination of Chevron with what are plausibly taken to be his
constitutional responsibilities. ' 42 But it is generally appropriate to recognize "[a] clear
statement requirement to protect individual liberties... [under] the AUMF. ' 3
Put simply, the emerging consensus would hold that as to controversies in which it
is asserted that the President has exceeded his power, and thus violated structural
constraints, the President should enjoy deference. Where, however, the asserted excess
invades individual rights, the President's assertion of power should be more closely
scrutinized; it must satisfy a clear statement rule requiring that the President's authority
be clearly expressed in a statute. This clear statement rule is designed to enforce and
protect underlying constitutional guarantees. In the balance of this section, I will
endeavor to show that this formulation is based on a rights/structure dichotomy that is
unsupported and untenable. 44
restraint that upholds an agency's construction of a statute that it administers if the agency's
interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Where there are competing alternatives, and each is
reasonable, courts understand the statute to have delegated the choice among the reasonable
alternatives to the agency.
39. See Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989).
40. See id. This is frequently the case on the domestic side as well. See, e.g., Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
41. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 36; Sunstein, supra note 36. While still serving
as an appellate court judge, Chief Justice John Roberts strongly implied his support for
according Chevron deference to presidential interpretations, without qualification as to whether
individual rights are implicated. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Roberts, J., concurring), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1928 (2005).
42. See Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2671. In an earlier issue of the Harvard Law Review,
Professor Sunstein took a dimmer view of Chevron deference for the executive branch's
interpretation of its own authority: "A rule of deference in the face of ambiguity would be
inconsistent with understandings, endorsed by Congress, of the considerable risks posed by
administrative discretion. An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power."
Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 445
(1989).

43. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 2104 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at
War, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 47). Professors Bradley and Goldsmith offer an appropriate caveat:
"[niot every potential liberty intrusion during war warrants protection through a clear statement
requirement." Id.
44. Professor Sunstein's formulation does not expressly track the rights/structure
dichotomy. He urges deference to the President unless the assertion of presidential power
involves "constitutionally sensitive interests." Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2670. The specific
example he offers involves individual rights (specifically the individual rights involved in the
indefinite executive detention of a United States citizen as an enemy combatant.) See id. Yet
Professor Sunstein's prior writings certainly identify structural interests as important, and
therefore at least potentially "sensitive." See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 42. But if structural
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A. The DistinctionIs Incoherent
The distinction between individual rights and structure withers on examination.
First, the government's constitutional structure is designed, in large part, to promote
liberty. Thus, for example, the states may not consent to federal violations of state
sovereignty, because the federal structure is not designed for the benefit of the states
but for the benefit of the people.45 The same holds for separation of powers, especially
the separation of powers between the President and Congress. Thus, the fact that the
President signed a bill does not cure objections that it upsets the constitutional balance
of power by aggrandizing Congress at the expense of the President, even where the
objection involves no assertion of individual rights. 46 To take an example, Congress
enacted the AUMF in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, authorizing
the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against persons, nations, or
organizations he determines to have aided or participated in those attacks or to harbor
those responsible. Imagine, for example, the President decides to invade another
country under the AUMF. The rights/structure distinction would hold that the
President's decision to initiate a war is entitled to deference because it does not
implicate individual rights. President Bush's decision to commence a war in
Afghanistan was based on the AUMF and no deference at all is required to sustain the
action; it is nearly impossible to conceive of the argument that the AUMF did not
authorize the war in Afghanistan. But subsequent military ventures, especially as we
move temporally further away from the attacks that prompted the AUMF, may well
raise exceedingly difficult questions. Such a decision would immediately implicate
Congress's constitutional power to declare war. Not because Congress may not
delegate the power to initiate a war,47 but because too readily ascribing such a result to
Congress will have the effect of altering the balance of power between the President
and Congress. While this is a structural issue, it is grounded on concerns about
protecting individuals from all that a national engagement in war entails. 48
The distinction also leads to anomalous results. For example, it requires reading
Youngstown as a case that is primarily about vindicating domestic private property
rights rather than about constraining presidential power with respect to foreign and

interests-such as preserving Congress's legislative role-are also to be considered as the sort
of interests that exclude deference and raise a requirement of legislative clarity, then it is
difficult to see when the President would ever be entitled to deference. Indeed, once we accept
structural interests as sensitive in the same sense as individual rights, we will only apply
deference after determining that a particular assertion of presidential power is legislatively
authorized and does not violate constitutional values, at which point deference is hardly needed.
On this conceptualization, then, claims for deference are conclusory.
45. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
46. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Cf United States
v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Talbot v.
Seaman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
48. See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. at 269-72 11
(1803); JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrrtnMoN § 1166 (1833).
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military affairs. The Supreme Court rejected this reading in Hamdiv. Rumsfeld.49 Were
Youngstown limited to domestic property rights, would we apply deference to the
President's determination that he was authorized to seize Canadian steel mills to
supply the troops under the laws authorizing the Korean War or under other statutes
like the Food and Forage Act?50
Clear statement rules also may both over- and under-protect individual rights. Clear
statement rules notoriously overprotect the values that they are designed to advance.
Where a clear statement rule protects a constitutional value, for example, it provides
"cover" for an interpreter-and especially a court-to push the value further than it
would if it had to do so forthrightly as a matter of express constitutional interpretation,
frequently resulting in a declaration that a law is unconstitutional.5'
A clear statement rule designed to protect individual rights would also be
underprotective. Those who benefit from presidential action-for example, by the
improved security against terrorist attack-have an individual liberty interest in seeing
that the President carries out his proposed action. The clear statement approach does
not take into account these liberty interests. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,52 for example, the Supreme Court considered whether the FDA's jurisdiction
includes the authority to regulate nicotine and the tobacco products that deliver it. By
the terms of the relevant statute, the FDA has jurisdiction over drugs and the devices
by which drugs are delivered. Nicotine satisfied the statutory definition of a drug, while
cigarettes and other tobacco products are well-within the definition of a device. At first
glance, then, the FDA seemed to have jurisdiction over nicotine and tobacco products.

49. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,536 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("We have long since
made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights
of the Nation's citizens." (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343
U.S. 579, 587 (1952)). But see Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,473-74 (1994).
50. 41 U.S.C. § 11 (2000). The Food and Forage Act provides that:
No contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made, unless the
same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment,
except in the Department of Defense and in the Department of Transportation with
respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, for
clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital
supplies, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current year.
§ 11(a). If the Department of Justice's argument on domestic wiretapping is correct, then it
appears to follow that the Food and Forage Act provides the President with authority to finance
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq without receiving an annual appropriation from Congress. The
prohibition against entering into a purchase or contract is drafted in a way that parallels the
prohibition in FISA. Compare § 1l(a) ("unless the same is authorized by law") with Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (Supp. 112002) ("[n]otwithstanding any other
law"). If the AUMF is an authorization to the President to engage in surveillance aimed at
persons somehow linked to the enemy because Presidents have done that in past wars, certainly
Presidents have procured weapons and war material (including steel) in past wars. Why, then,
isn't the AUMF an authorization within the terms of the Food and Forage Act, just as it is an
authorization in the terms of FISA?
51. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 637 (1992).
52. 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 315 (2000).
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Granting the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products would have dramatic
consequences, and the Court referred particularly to the economic consequences for
tobacco companies and their suppliers, tobacco farmers. Given these consequences, the
Supreme Court declined to find that the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products absent a clear indication from Congress of the intent to extend the FDA's
jurisdiction to tobacco. This decision might be understood as vindicating the individual
rights of the tobacco companies as well as the farmers who supply them. But it can just
as readily be characterized as undermining the individual rights of those who would
have benefited from FDA regulation, particularly children who might have been
prevented from taking up smoking. These individuals are not identifiable
and were not
5 3
before the Court. The Court's opinion did not consider their interests.
Finally, the rights/structure dichotomy appears to rest on a negative conception of
liberty.5 4 Construing statutes in a way that defers to the President on structural matters
may well detract from the social and political conditions necessary for individuals to
enjoy meaningful liberty. Indeed, this appears to be the theory expressed by James
Madison 55--at the Constitution structures power among the branches of government
in order to deploy each branch as a check on the others. 56
B. Against Loaded Dice
The framework that yields deference to the President in cases involving "mere"
structure, but requires a clear statement of presidential authority where the exercise of
that authority implicates individual rights results from an attempt to effectuate and
enforce constitutional principles in the context of statutory interpretation. The
rights/structure dichotomy, however, rests on an incomplete, and ultimately
tendentious, reading of the Constitution. It thus unfairly loads the dice in favor of
particular outcomes.
The rights/structure dichotomy is on both scores inconsistent with the essential view
of the Constitution found in Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence.5 7 The
opinion's strength is its highly nuanced 58understanding of the tensions-indeed the
paradoxes-inherent in the Constitution.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or
even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the

53. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. This is especially peculiar for Cass Sunstein, who has made much of the incoherence of
this distinction. See CASS R. SuNsTEiN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM oFFREE SPEECH (1993).
55. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 & 51 (James Madison).
56. See infra Part I.B.
57. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,634-55 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
58. This is also the opinion's chief weakness. See EDWIN S. CORWIN, The Steel Seizure
Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 121

(1976).
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dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. 59
The Constitution, as explained by Justice Jackson, means simultaneously to protect
against oppressive abuse of power and to enable the effective use of government
power. In a sense, this is the opinion's weakness; it is so nuanced and abstract that it is
hard to derive useful principles to guide interpretation. 60 But, insofar as Justice
Jackson's view is correct, it at least counsels against simple formulas that weight the
scales of interpretation in favor of one institution or constitutional value. What Justice
Jackson's insight calls for is careful case-by-case examination that gives due weight to
all the competing constitutional values and institutions and that recognizes that those
weights will vary from setting to setting.
C. Structure and Individual Rights in ConstitutionalAdjudication
A review of cases demonstrates that the Supreme Court has in fact not followed the
rights/structure dichotomy. In a number of cases that do not directly implicate
individual rights, the Court declined to defer to the executive branch and intervened to
construe statutes to effectuate its view of underlying structural values. On the
individual rights side, the Court has not actually articulated a clear statement rule and
in fact has declined to employ the principle sub silentio even where it means to protect
individual liberty interests.
1. Deference in Statutory Adjudication
a. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 6
It is possible to read the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdi as being all about
individual rights. While the case certainly vindicates the rights of United States citizens
detained as enemy combatants, the controlling opinions 62 also amount to a forceful
rejection of claims for deference to the President's interpretation of his powers. The
case presented two major questions. First, is the President authorized to detain United
States citizens as enemy combatants? 63 Second, if the President is so authorized, is a
citizen detained as an enemy combatant entitled to challenge the validity of the enemy

59. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635.
60. Justice Jackson himself says as much, "I have heretofore, and do now, give to the
enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable practical
implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." Steel Seizure, 343 U.S.
at 640.
61. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
62. There is no single majority, but the opinions of Justices O'Connor (for the plurality)
and Souter (concurring along with Justice Ginsburg) represent a six-Justice majority of the
Court and share a common approach, even if they differ somewhat as to application. Two of
those six Justices (Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist) are no longer on the Court,
which leaves doubt as to the future vitality of the Hamdi approach.
63. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
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combatant designation, and, if so, through what process? 6 4 The solicitor general
specifically urged that the Court defer to the President on this second set of questions.
In response to the first question, the Court concluded that the President may detain
United States citizens as enemy combatants. In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
located this authority in the AUMF. Not one word of the plurality rests this conclusion
on deference to the President's interpretation. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's
determination hinges on her reading of the international law of war principles, which
she took to be a relevant interpretive background because they show what Congress
meant in enacting the AUMF. 65 While Justice Souter's concurring opinion did not find
this background persuasive in answering the question, his opinion accords with Justice
O'Connor's
in withholding any hint of deference to the President's interpretation of his
66
authority.
On the second question, the Solicitor General argued that "'[riespect for separation
of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military
decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict' ought to eliminate entirely
any individual process.
,67 In the alternative, the Solicitor General contended that
the judiciary should review particular enemy combatant designations "under a very
deferential 'some evidence' standard. 68 Justice O'Connor's opinion rejected these
claims for deference. Instead, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause requires
that citizens who are designated enemy combatants are entitled to an adjudication of
their status before a neutral tribunal, with notice of the charges against them and an
opportunity to rebut those charges and the evidentiary basis for them. Rather than
deferring to the President, Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that "[iln so holding, we
necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation of powers principles
69
mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances."
b. The Rights/Structure Dichotomy Generally
In advocating the rights/structure dichotomy, Professor Sunstein suggests that we
look.to ordinary principles of domestic law. In particular, he points to administrative
law and the doctrine of Chevron deference. But two sets of cases illustrate the Court
has not actually followed the rights/structure dichotomy. First, in a line of cases
culminating in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline,70 the Court addressed the issue of
whether Congress may delegate its taxation power. In two cases decided in 1974, the

64. Id.
65. Id. at 519 ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,'
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances
considered here.").
66. In fact, only Justice Thomas's opinion can be understood as granting a degree of
deference to the President. Because the opinion of Justices Scalia and Stevens is based on their
reading of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, they did not directly confront the question of
deference to the President's reading of his statutory powers.
67. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527 (alterations in original).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 535.
70. 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
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Court noted that interpreting a statute to have delegated taxing authority would raise a
serious constitutional issue. 71 Those cases dealt with statutory authorizations to
administrative agencies to impose fees on regulated industries. The Court held that the
fee charged had to correspond to the cost of regulation and could not be designed to
raise revenue for other public purposes of the administrative agency unrelated to the
regulation of the fee-payer. If the amount of the fee was designed to underwrite the
agencies other functions, it would be a tax.
If the Court were to follow the rights/structure dichotomy, the Court could have
regarded the cases as involving individual rights (the right to property and to be free
from the burden of taxation) and so have construed the statute narrowly in order to
avoid the conflict with individual rights. Alternatively, the Court might have regarded
the statute as raising no significant individual rights (being a mere economic
regulation) and so have vindicated the executive branch's assertion of power. The
Court, however, followed neither approach. Instead, the Court concerned itself with the
role of Congress and the role of the administrative agencies. The Court emphasized
that "[tiaxation is a legislative function, and Congress... is the sole organ for levying
taxes...,72 and read the statutes so as to avoid authorizing the agency to conduct a
"search of revenue in the manner of an Appropriations Committee of the House., 73 In
Skinner, the Court resolved the underlying constitutional question, ruling that Congress
may delegate its taxing power to administrative agencies. 74 The Skinner Court
explained that the 1974 cases interpreted the statutes narrowly in order to avoid the
delegation question,75 which is a maneuver designed to protect the constitutional role
of Congress, not to protect the President or individual rights.76
The second line of cases is that dealing with the relative roles of the judiciary and
the President in the constitutional structure. For example, in United States v. Nixon77
the Court considered the existence and scope of executive privilege in the context of a
criminal proceeding. The Court rejected President Nixon's claims of executive
privilege over the Watergate tapes on the ground that the tapes were essential to the
fair administration ofjustice. While this aspect of the opinion has the ring of individual
rights, speaking as it does of Due Process, in fact the case did not involve an assertion
of individual rights. None of the Watergate defendants sought the production of the
tapes. Instead, their production was demanded by the prosecutor. The Court's
facts" was aimed at protecting the
discussion of the "need to develop all relevant
78
institutional interests of the judiciary itself.

71. Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); Nat'l Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
72. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 340.
73. Id. at 341.
74. Skinner, 490 U.S. 212.
75. Id. at 224.
76. It is, of course, possible to conceptualize these cases as being designed as a procedural
safeguard of individual rights. But this observation simply underscores the incoherence of the
rights/structure dichotomy. All elements of the Constitution's structure are designed, in part, to
secure liberty. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
77. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
78. Id. at 709.
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The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts
that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either
by the prosecution or by the defense.79
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, s° the President claimed that his assertion of authority should
not be subject to judicial review, or in the alternative to more than the most cursory
review. In rejecting this claim, the Court did not rely on concern about individual
rights. Instead, the plurality asserted the importance of the Court's own role within our
constitutional structure: "the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the
individual case . . . cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of
powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of
government.",'
Lastly, the Court's cases vindicating the President's role in the structure of
government do not support the rights/structure dichotomy. For example, the Court
recently revived the Totten rule. 82 This rule prohibits suits against the United States
based on covert espionage agreements. The plaintiffs in Tenet claimed that they spied
on behalf of the United States during the Cold War in return for promises that the
Central Intelligence Agency would provide them with continuing financial support.
The Court invoked the largely forgotten Totten precedent despite the significant
individual interests asserted by the plaintiff. The Court quoted Totten's holding that
"public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of
which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential. ' 3
2. Clear Statement Rules in Adjudication
The claim that presidential actions that implicate individual rights must be premised
on a clear statutory statement of authority suffers similar infirmities. First, as a
descriptive claim about legal doctrine, it is inaccurate. The Court does not require the
President to point to a clearly stated authority even where the President's action
threatens individual rights. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,84 for example, the Court
faced a claim that the President had violated the plaintiff's individual right to judicial
process and its underlying property rights. In order to settle the Iran Hostage Crisis, the
President issued an executive order expunging all attachments against the assets or
property of Iran in United States courts. The order also dismissed all claims against
Iran and transferred those claims for arbitration before the newly created Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal in the Hague. There was no statutory basis for the latter action and the
President cited none. Far from requiring an express statement of authority, the Court

79. Id.
80. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
81. Id. at 535-36 (emphasis in original).
82. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005) (reviving the rule established in Totten v. United
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875)).
83. Id. at 12 (quoting Toten, 92 U.S. at 107).
84. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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read statutes in the area that did not grant such authority as nevertheless
"implicitly
85
approv[ing] the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement."
More recently, the Court's opinions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld8 6 preeminently involved
questions about individual rights. Yet, the opinions did not formulate a clear statement
rule. 87 Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion regarded the AUMF to be a sufficient
authorization to allow the President to detain enemy combatants. Justice Souter, joined
in concurrence by Justice Ginsburg, would have required a clear statement of
presidential authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, but not because
such a requirement is categorically applicable or because a categorical requirement
would effectuate constitutional values relating to individual rights. They would have
required such a clear statement as a way of giving "robust[]" effect to another statute,
the Non-Detention Act. Far from being based on free-standing individual rights
concerns, the underlying premise is one of supporting constitutional structure, albeit in
the factual context of a claim of individual rights. Congress has significant powers
relating to military affairs and the conduct of war, as well as relating to the liberties of
United States citizens. In recognition of Congress's central role in this setting, Justices
Souter and Ginsburg sought to read the congressional enactment "robustly." Their
opinion thus stands not for the proposition that individual rights concerns are somehow
privileged over structural concerns, but rather for the proposition that statutes should
be read in a way that recognizes Congress's role in the exercise of the8war
power and
9
that does not diminish Congress's capacity to play its role effectively.
From the standpoint of civil liberties, it is easy to see the allure of the clear
statement rule. In fact, such a rule is at best of limited value as demonstrated in the

85. Id. at 680. This twist of statutory construction is difficult to reconcile with the way the
Court read the statutory background in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952). See HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION (1990).
86. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
87. Professor Sunstein has made the case for reading Hamdi as establishing a clear
statement rule:
In his concurring opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice Souter... emphasized
'the need for a clearly expressed congressional resolution of the competing
claims.' Not having found any such resolution, he concluded that Hamdi's
detention was unlawful. The Hamdi plurality disagreed, but it did not question
Justice Souter's claim that a clear statement was required. It concluded instead that
the AUMF provided that statement ....
Justice Souter's view in Hamdi is reasonable, but the plurality's position seems
to me correct, and it is consistent with what I emphasize here: a requirement of
legislative clarity for any interference with constitutionally sensitive interests.
Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2670. The problem with this reading of Hamdi is that it fails to take
account of the crucial impact that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000), had on the
reasoning of both Justice Souter's concurrence and Justice O'Connor's plurality opinions. These
opinions did not look for legislative clarity to protect individual liberty concerns. Rather, these
opinions demand a clear congressional statement in order to overcome an express statutory
prohibition.
88. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545.
89. Of course, the constitutional structure of governmental power has as one of its purposes
the protection of individual rights. This raises again the observation that attempts to distinguish
the two settings will ultimately prove incoherent. See supraPart H.A.
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Court's infamous opinion in Korematsu v. United States.90 What is wrong with
Korematsu is not that it failed to require a clear statement. Indeed, such a requirement
would have been unavailing as Congress had clearly authorized forced relocations.
What is wrong with Korematsu is that the Court shrunk from its duty to enforce the
constitutional rights of the Japanese-Americans who had been forced into the
internment camps on the basis of nothing more than racist generalizations.
3. The Avoidance Canon
A better way of reading the doctrine in this area is to understand the cases as
employing the avoidance canon-the Court should read statutes, where they are
critically ambiguous, to avoid significant constitutional controversies. 9 1 This directs
interpreters to a much narrower inquiry. First, the statute's meaning should be
"grievously" ambiguous. This means that the interpreter faces two equally plausible
constructions, not that the interpreter faces two threshold-plausible constructions one
of which is more persuasive than the other. In other words, as Justice Breyer put it in
the analogous context of the rule of lenity, the avoidance canon should be understood
to apply "only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived.... we can
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. 92 Second, the avoidance
canon is appropriate only where invoking it actually avoids a significantconstitutional
controversy. 93 When limited in this way, the avoidance canon is a reasonable
mechanism for resolving otherwise intractable statutory ambiguity.
If these predicates for avoidance are not carefully observed, the canon is subject to
mischief.94 The DOJ whitepaper on the NSA surveillance program illustrates the
problems. Even though FISA prohibits warrantless NSA surveillance and the AUMF
does not address the issue of warrants or surveillance, the Justice Department stretches
to find ambiguity as to which statute should govern the situation. While there may be
settings in which prohibiting the President from engaging in warrantless surveillance
would be unconstitutional, neither the whitepaper nor any of the other Bush
Administration's defenses of the program places the NSA program within such a
setting. 95 Moreover, the mechanisms that preserve the President's capacity to act with
dispatch move FISA even further away from conflicting with the President's
constitutional powers. The DOJ whitepaper tendentiously raises the specter of a

90. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
91. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
92. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)). Justice Scalia has also
criticized the rule of lenity along with clear statement rules. See ANTONIN SCAuA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 27-29 (1997).

93. See Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
94. Professor Powell's contribution to this symposium shows just how pernicious the canon
can be when employed by the executive branch itself, instead of by a court. See H. JEFFERSON
PowEL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORrrY ovER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (2002). His admonition against executive branch use of the avoidance canon is
now powerfully illustrated by the misuse of the canon in the DOJ whitepaper.
95. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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constitutional issue and uses that projection to rework the statutory overlay to the
President's advantage.
D. The Complexity of Statutory Regimes
Much of the discussion of how to read the President's statutory war powers is highly
artificial in that it tends to frame the inquiry as determining whether one specific statute
either does or does not authorize the power that the President is asserting. This will
only rarely be the case. Presidential action and assertions of power occur mostly in the
context of a welter of statutes, some of which will be more or less authority-conferring
and others more or less authority-prohibiting. It is the common, and difficult, job of an
interpreter to harmonize this jumble of laws. In this setting, Chevron deference is a
potential conclusion rather than a helpful starting principle, and this is the essence of
the Mead inquiry. 96 Thus, the President is entitled to deference if Congress means for
the President to enjoy it, but that is itself a difficult question of construction and one
made more difficult by the potentially wide and discordant range of relevant
congressional pronouncements.
Professor Sunstein has suggested that we look to ordinary principles of
administrative law to find guiding principles for construing the President's power in the
context of military and foreign affairs, and in particular under the AUMF.97 Taking him
up on this suggestion, an illuminating example can be found in the President's
authority over federal procurement. The President enjoys constitutional authority
bearing on this subject. As the repository of "the executive power" charged with
"tak[ing] care that the laws be faithfully executed" the Constitution provides a basis on
which the President might assert supervisory control of federal procurement.98 In the
context of military procurement, the President may add his authority as commander in
chief. How far these powers alone extend is a largely uninteresting question as
Congress has enacted a complex statutory regime regulating this area. The regime
confers on the President extensive power over federal procurement. The Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) authorizes the President to
"prescribe policies and directives that the President considers necessary to carry out
this subtitle." 99 This is an expansive articulation that yields a broad power. In general,
the courts have understood this power to confer upon the President the authority to
issue any rule that is designed to promote economy and efficiency in federal
procurement. In determining whether the President has acted within this power, the
courts have articulated a highly deferential test: the President is within his procurement
power as long as there is a reasonable
basis to believe that his procurement rule will
°°
promote economy and efficiency.1
Presidents have exercised this power in a broad range of settings and often have
exercised the power in ways that seem designed more to promote policy goals quite

96. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Mead Corp. v. Tilley,
490 U.S. 714 (1989).
97. See Sunstein, supra note 36.
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
99. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 40 U.S.C. 121(a) (Supp. II 2002).
100. See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
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apart from economy and efficiency. ' 01These assertions of power have often implicated
other statutory policies and commands, and the courts have struggled with how to
harmonize the President's obviously broad FPASA power with completely separate
statutory regimes. For example, during the inflation crisis of the 1970s, President
Carter issued an executive order designed to mollify the inflationary pressures on the
nation's economy by setting forth a system of voluntary wage and price controls. This
system was voluntary because a statute, the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act2
(COWPSA) was understood to have forbidden the President to mandate controls.'1
President Carter's executive order mandated that covered federal contractors comply
with the voluntary controls. The federal contractors and the labor unions whose
members were employed by the contractors argued that the President's mandate
violated the prohibition. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the executive order
on the ground that it did not actually mandate compliance, since federal contractors
could forego contracts and so avoid submitting to wage and price controls.'0 3
President Clinton invoked the FPASA power to issue an executive order prohibiting
federal contractors from permanently replacing lawfully striking workers. This time the
federal contractors claimed the order violated the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), which permits employers to permanently replace strikers. 104 The D.C. Circuit
ruled in their favor. First, it noted what a vast segment of the labor force is employed
by federal contractors. 0 5 Then it refused to extend what it termed "Chevron-like
deference" to the President's determination, as had the District Court.' 6 The D.C.
Circuit ruled that the President's order was preempted by federal labor law, even
though the NLRA does not require that employers maintain the power to replace
strikers.' ° 7 This, according to the court, was because the NLRA enacts a policy that
leaves such replacements acceptable. The President, according to the court, may not
use his other powers in a way that erects a regulatory regime contrary to the policy of
the NLRA. In other words, if the executive order had been proprietary-a mere
contract provision-it would have been permissible. Because the order actually would

101. For example, President Carter used his FPASA authority to respond to limit wage and
price increases as part of an overall effort to limit inflationary pressures on the national
economy. See Exec. Ord. No. 12,092,43 Fed. Reg. 51,375 (Nov. 1, 1978). Moreover, various
Presidents used the statutory procurement power to issue executive orders forbidding
employment discrimination and mandating equal employment opportunities, even before the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 made employment discrimination illegal. See Exec. Ord. No. 11,246,
30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965); Exec. Ord. No. 11,141, 29 Fed. Reg. 2,477 (Feb. 12,
1964); Exec. Ord. No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961); Exec. Ord. No. 10,557, 19
Fed. Reg. 5655 (Sept. 3, 1954); Exec. Ord. No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (Aug. 13, 1953).
102. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974).
Interestingly, the statute itself is not phrased as a prohibition. It only states that COWPSA does
not authorize mandatory wage or price controls.
103. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784.
104. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
105. As of 1993, federal contractors employed 22% of the nation's labor force. Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
106. Id.
107. An employer may agree, as part of a collective bargaining agreement for example, that it
will not permanently replace lawfully striking employees.
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have effects108 on labor-management beyond the contractual relations of the contractor
and the federal government, the court deemed it regulatory and therefore contrary to
the NLRA.
More recently, the D.C. Circuit returned to the issue of conflict between the
President's FPASA power and the NLRA in UA W-Labor Employment TrainingCorp.
v. Chao.'° 9 There the court upheld an executive order issued by President Bush
requiring federal contractors to post signs notifying employees that they cannot be
compelled to join a union or to pay dues unrelated to a union's representational
activities. This time the court found no conflict with the NLRA, but again did not
employ principles of deference to reach this conclusion.
I will not attempt to reconcile these cases.' 10 What is interesting about these cases,
for our purposes, is that they show that the courts do not in fact apply deference in
determining the scope of the President's statutory power, even in the context of a
statute that grants such power broadly by its terms. In fact, the President's power under
FPASA would appear to be a prime candidate for Chevron deference. It is broadly
worded, seemingly enough so as to satisfy the Mead inquiry. Moreover, it operates in
an area that is fraught with policy considerations and where legal principles of decision
are lacking. Finally, it is an area where courts lack substantive expertise to secondguess the President. The involvement of courts in these cases is aimed at preserving not
its own role so much as preserving Congress's. Congress enacted the NLRA and
COWPSA. Applying Chevron deference to the President's determination that these
statutes do not diminish his FPASA power could undermine the vitality of these other
laws.
The D.C. Circuit has recently faced a complicated statutory regime that relates
specifically to the President's military and foreign affairs powers. In Acree v. Republic
of Iraq, a group of American personnel held as prisoners of war during the first Gulf
War sued the Republic of Iraq for injuries suffered from torture inflicted upon them by
the regime of Saddam Hussein. 1 1 Their suit was brought under the Alien Tort Claims
Act 1 2 and the torture exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. 1 3 In the wake
of the current Iraq War, Congress enacted the Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act (EWSAA) of 2003, which authorized the President to suspend any

108. Here the court was engaged in speculation as the executive order was enjoined before it
ever had a chance to have any impact on the economy or on labor-management relations.
109. 325 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
110. I offer two reasons for refraining. First, the doctrinal law of labor-management relations
is not relevant to this discussion. Second, I do not believe the cases can be reconciled. Take
Kahn and Reich, for example. These cases cannot be reconciled on the ground that one is meant
to operate only within the area of federal procurement (Kahn) and the other is meant to operate
as an economy-wide regulation (Reich). In fact, the economy and efficiency rationale that
President Carter offered was founded on the consequences for the overall economy. As a result
of President Carter's order, the federal government rejected many of the lowest bids (because of
noncompliance with the price controls) in favor of higher bids (that did comply). President
Carter's rationale was that compliance with the control system would reduce inflation in the
overall economy and thus would yield lower prices to the government in the long run.

111. Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1928
(2005).
112. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
113. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000).
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law relating to Iraq as a sponsor of terrorism." 4 Under this authority, the President
suspended the American POWs' lawsuit. In reconciling these conflicting statutes, the
D.C. Circuit did not defer to the President's interpretation of his authority under
the
5
EWSAA, even though the court upheld the President's assertion of power."1
These cases help shed light on the Court's approach in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld." 16 There
the Court faced the same statutory setting: a broadly worded grant of power to the
President and a statute that at least called into question whether the President could
apply that broad power to designate and detain, as enemy combatants, United States
citizens. The AUMF did not speak of detention or enemy combatants at all, let alone of
how these concepts might apply to United States citizens. Countervailing against the
President's AUMF authority was the Non-Detention Act (NDA). 7 Hamdi required the
Court to consider the interaction of these two statutes. Significantly, none of the six
justices in the majority applied deference to the President's interpretation that his
statutory power under the AUMF was undiminished by the NDA. Moreover, neither
opinion demanded a clear statement because the President's order implicated
individual fights. Rather, Justice Souter's concurring opinion looked for a clear
statement of authority in order to overcome the NDA.
E. Early JudicialTreatment of the Issues
The interpretive issues raised by statutes that bear on the President's authority as
commander in chief were raised early in the tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall in
connection with what is often referred to as the "Quasi-War with France." The
Marshall Court held that Congress had authorized a war even though it had not
formally made a declaration.' 8 The Marshall Court set forth three precepts for the9
conduct of that war. First, the President is bound by the limits enacted by Congress. 1
Second, the statutes authorizing and limiting the President's power would be
interpreted, insofar as possible, to render them consistent with the obligations of
international law.' 20 Third, the President's interpretation of his own authority121was not
entitled to deference and was to be given no weight in construing a statute.

114. Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-11, §§ 150203, 117 Stat. 559 (2003).
115. Then-Judge John Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion. In his opinion, he
included a footnote addressing the question of deference to the President. The footnote begins
with a citation to Chamberof Commerce v. Reich (for a related discussion see supranote 74 and
accompanying text) for the proposition that the issue of whether the President is entitled to
deference is an open one. He then offers that "it is interesting to note that this would be an easy
case had the EWSAA provided that, say, the Secretary of State may exercise the authority
conferred under Section 1503. It is puzzling why the case should be so much harder when the
authority is given to the Secretary's boss." Acree, 370 F.3d at 63 n.2. Other than noting the
seeming irony, Judge Roberts's concurring opinion does not explore the question further.
116. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
117. Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
118. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
119. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
120. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
121. Talbot, 5 U.S. at 10 (refusing to admit the President's interpretation of his statutory
power); CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. at 78 n.t.
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The first of these precepts was set forth in Little v. Barreme. Congress had
authorized the President to intercept any American ship bound for a French port.
President Adams issued an order directing naval officers to intercept any suspected
American ship bound to or from a French port, regarding the statutory limitation to
ships bound for a French port as undermining the central purpose of preventing trading
with the enemy. Captain Little captured the Danish-flagged Flying Fish as it traveled
from the French port of Jeremie to the Danish port of St. Thomas. The issue in Little
was whether Captain Little owed damages for wrongfully seizing the Flying Fish. Chief
Justice Marshall ruled that the capture was not authorized by statute and could not be
authorized by the President attempting alone to overcome the statutory limitation (even
122
though in the absence of a statute, the President might have had such authority).
"[T]he [President's] instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or
123
legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass."'
Thus, Captain Little was liable for damages even though he was carrying out the
President's order as to how to conduct the naval war against France.
The second principle was established in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy. The
Charming Betsy was owned by Jared Shattuck, who was born in Connecticut, but lived
in St. Thomas as a Danish subject and may thus have renounced his United States
citizenship. While the Charming Betsy was sailing from St. Thomas to Guadaloupe
under a Danish flag, it was captured by a French frigate. Several days later, the USS
Constellation captured the Charming Betsy from the French and Captain Murray sent
the Charming Betsy to Philadelphia as a lawful prize. The Court limited the scope of
the Nonintercourse Act so as to exclude commerce by neutrals:
[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be
construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than
is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.1 24
Finally, deference to the President's construction of his authority in the conduct of
war was rejected most prominently in Talbot v. Seeman, but the rejection was
reiterated in Charming Betsy. In Talbot, the Court faced the question of whether a
capture, this time by the famed USS Constitution, was lawful. The first question was
whether a state of war existed between the United States and France. The Court held
that Congress need not formally declare war in order to create a state of war, and
congressional enactments amounted to a declaration of war with France. The Court
then went on to consider what authority Congress had vested in the Navy to re-capture
American vessels. On this question, lawyers representing Captain Talbot sought to
introduce the instructions that President Adams had issued to naval officers.
Specifically, Talbot's lawyer argued for deference to the President's judgment: "My
reasons for wishing to read [the instructions] were, because the opinion of learned men,
and men of science, will always have some weight with other learned men. And the

122. Little, 6 U.S. at 179; see also Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure),
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (relying on Little to construe narrowly the President's authority to act
contra legem).

123. Little, 6 U.S. at 179.
124. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
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court would consider well the opinion of the executive before they would decide
contrary to it.' 25 Justices Chase and Paterson objected most strenuously. As Justice
Paterson put it: "The instructions can only be evidence of the opinion of the executive,
which is not binding upon us.' ' 126 Chief Justice Marshall harbored "no objection to
hearing [the instructions], but they will have no influence on my opinion."' 27 The
position of Justices Chase and 28Paterson prevailed, and the Court refused to hear
President Adams's instructions.1
In Charming Betsy, Captain Murray's lawyers fared only a little better. The Court
allowed President Adams's instructions to be read, but only after Justice Chase
renewed his objection from Talbot: "[H]e was always against reading the instructions
of the executive; because if they go no further than the law, they are unnecessary; if
they exceed it, they are not warranted." 129 The Court's opinion showed no deference to
the President's instructions or the legal interpretation on which they were based.
Indeed, the opinion is remarkable for the absence of any deference to executive power
even for its factual determinations. Under the Court's holding in Talbot, Captain
Murray was entitled to salvage the CharmingBetsy only if the ship was "in a condition
to annoy American commerce,"' 30 which is to say that it was sufficiently armed for
offensive use. Chief Justice Marshall allowed that this is a question of degree and may
often be difficult. Nevertheless, he concluded that Captain Murray was wrong in
believing that the Charming Betsy was sufficiently equipped to menace American
commerce. "[T]here was on board but one musket, a few ounces of powder and a few
balls.... The capacity of this vessel
for offence appears not sufficient to warrant the
13 1
capture of her as an armed vessel."
F. InternationalLaw and the Charming Betsy Principle
The President's statutory power is construed against the background of international
law. For example, the plurality in Hamdi held that the AUMF authorizes the President
to detain enemy combatants captured in the Afghanistan War. To determine the scope
of this authority the Court looked to international law, concluding that the President
could detain enemy combatants only for the duration of the hostilities in Afghanistanas opposed to the duration of the War on Terror-and only for the purpose of
preventing the detainees from returning to the battlefield, but not for the purpose of
interrogation.'32
Not only does the Court use international law as context for understanding the scope
of presidential power, it also interprets statutes to conform with international law

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 10 n.t (1801).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 78 n.t.
Id. at 121.

131. Id.

132. Bradley and Goldsmith accept that international law may provide context that
demonstrates a grant or the existence of presidential power, but they question whether
international law can be taken to prohibit presidential power under the AUMF. Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 2097. The Hamdi plurality seems a clear counter-example.
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unless the statute clearly states its intention to contravene international law. Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith have asserted that under this interpretive rule, known as the
CharmingBetsy principle, the President's interpretation of international law is entitled
to deference. 133 If so, this would mean that the President is entitled to deference when
he determines that a limit found in international law does not apply to him and thus
does not limit his powers. Were this true, the President would be entitled to deference
for his determination that United States law cannot be understood to prohibit him from
ordering the use of torture to interrogate enemy combatants. The fact that this would
place the United States in violation of international law-in fact in violation of the
Convention Against Torture, to which the United States is a signatory'3--would be
rendered irrelevant to the analysis. The President will have determined that
international law cannot apply
to his order to use torture, for to do so would violate the
35
United States Constitution.'
The case for deference rests upon a limited conceptualization of the Charming
Betsy principle as being designed to restrain unelected, inexpert courts from reading
statutes in a way that places the nation in violation of international law.' 3 6 This is at
best a modem gloss on the precedent. In deciding the Charming Betsy, Chief Justice
John Marshall accorded no deference whatsoever to executive branch legal
interpretations. The Chief Justice not only failed to defer to the factual assessment of
the Navy officer who seized the Charming Betsy, he openly second-guessed that
officer's factual determination, in the context of the statutorily authorized naval war
with France.
The Supreme Court, in the Charming Betsy, was concerned about the nation
standing in violation of international law, but it nowhere indicates the institutional
concern that the courts might exercise their interpretive power to erroneously and
inexpertly place us in violation of international law. On the contrary, absent from the
Court's opinion is any sense of concern that the Court is institutionally incompetent, or
even less competent than the other branches. Rather, the Court seems to have regarded
international law as an important component of the rule of law and announced its
37
interpretive rule as a way of enforcing this value.'

133. Id. at 2096-100.
134. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted and openedfor signatureDecember 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987,
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985)), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm.
135. I say "will have" because this necessarily will have been the case in order for the
premise to this not-so-hypothetical to occur, see Bybee Memo, http://www.washingtonpost.con/
wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006), and
not because it is in any sense inevitable that the President or his lawyers will come to this
conclusion.
136. For this reason, Professors Bradley and Goldsmith go so far as to suggest that the
principle does not apply to executive actions. Bradley & Goldsmith, supranote 36, at 2097-98.
But this contention cannot be squared with the CharmingBetsy itself, which involved executive
branch action.
137. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). This concern is more expressly set forth in Judge
Peters's opinion for the district court. Id. at 68-69.
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The Charming Betsy principle can also be understood as enforcing the
Constitution's basic structure. Because the Court did not defer to the executive
branch's determinations, it preserved Congress's role in foreign and military affairs.
The Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to "define and punish...
offenses against the law of nations" 138 and "to make rules for the regulation and
government of the land and naval forces." 139 The Constitution's structure thus affords
Congress a central role in determining whether the nation should deviate from the law
of nations. The Charming Betsy stands for the proposition that the courts should not
readily accept unilateral executive action that places the U.S. at odds with international
law. Rather, the Court should act so as to preserve Congress's crucial role in
whether and to what extent the nation should deviate from international
determining
14°
law.
G. Deference and Executive Branch Legal Interpretation
Whatever purchase the case for deference might have in the context of judicial
interpretation, it has little relevance to internal executive branch interpretation. Legal
interpretation is not an abstract exercise;'41 it typically involves the construction of one
or more provisions of law in the context of a (more or less) specific set of facts. As
with judicial interpretation, it is appropriate for executive branch lawyers to defer to
the factual findings of others, including the President, within the executive branch.
With respect to matters of law, however, it would be nonsensical to claim that the
executive branch should defer to its own interpretation of the law.
Those who urge deference seem to be advocating judicial deference. But the
distinction between executive branch interpretation and judicial interpretation is not
made explicit, and this can contribute to an important problem. It may lead executive
branch lawyers to view their role as making whatever argument may plausibly be
available to support the assertion of power that the President wishes to make. This is
one conception of how OLC operated in rendering the Torture Memo.142 The
competing conception is that executive branch lawyers-particularly when they act as
ex ante counselors rather than ex post litigators-should follow their best
understanding of what the law demands and forbids. Where the executive branch
follows the latter model, the case for deference to its legal interpretations is at least
coherent. Where it follows the former model, claims of deference not only are
incoherent-there is no actual legal determination for the judiciary to defer to-the
application of deference would undermine the rule of law because the executive branch

138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 14.
140. Historical developments have favored presidential action, but have not resolved many
of the pressing legal questions about the allocation of power between Congress and the
President. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see PoWELL, supra note 94.
141. One of the most glaring weaknesses of the Torture Memo is its attempt to answer an
abstract question without reference to a factual context. The Memo undertakes to identify the
permissible standards of conduct under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. See Torture Memo, supra
note 7, at 1. It does not examine whether specified interrogation techniques are permissible.
142. In fact, this is sometimes offered as a defense of OLC. See Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 29.
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would no longer be bound by legal constraints, only by the limits of its lawyers'
imaginations.
III. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
PONDERING THE IMPONDERABLES

Statutory interpretation should proceed from a fulsome understanding of the way in
which the Constitution structures government power and of the role that each branch is
designed to play within that structure. The first constitutional protection for liberty is
not individual rights, but the system of checks and balances. To operate effectively,
each branch must be able to act as a check on the others.143 An approach to statutory
interpretation that privileges some aspects of the constitutional structure over others is
bound to distort and undermine the effectiveness of the constitutional architecture.
The rights/structure dichotomy threatens to work precisely this distortion. It would
privilege the role and power of the presidency as well as individual rights. These are
surely constitutional values of the first rank, but they are not alone. The role of
Congress as an institutional check on presidential aggrandizement is vital. Moreover,
the fundamental constitutional commitment to republican self-government can be
largely located in Congress. The structure of Congress itself and its interaction with the
President are designed to create an environment in which meaningful deliberation on
the nation's interest might take place. Congress is thus not only meant to be a vehicle
for dampening the influence of faction; 44 it is also designed to improve the quality of
government decision making by introducing a variety of occasions for deliberation.
Finally, Congress is constitutionally designed to introduce openness to governmental
decision making. 145 This openness, along with other aspects of Congress's structure, 146
enhances public accountability and participation in the process of government decision
making.
These abstract structures play out in concrete circumstances. For example, in the
controversy over the treatment of enemy prisoners, one military officer declared:
Congress should have oversight of treatment of prisoners. That is the way; the
Army should not take it upon itself to determine what is acceptable for America to
do in regards to treatment of prisoners. That's a value... that's more than just a
military decision, that's a values decision, and therefore Congress needs to know
about it, and therefore the American people need to have an honest representation
14 7
of what's going on presented to them so that they can have a say in that.

143. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).
144. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton).
145. The Journal Clause embodies the constitutional presumption that congressional
proceedings will be public, or at least a matter of public record. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
146. The primary mechanism of accountability is the direct and frequent election of the
House of Representatives. The Seventeenth Amendment, of course, expanded direct election to
the United States Senate. This direct accountability and the resulting public participation in
elections, campaigns, and the ongoing conduct of representatives in office is further buttressed
by the First Amendment's right of petition.
147. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEADERSHIP FAILuRE: FIRSTHAND ACcouNTS OF TORTURE OF
IRAQI DETAINEES BY THE U.S. ARMY'S 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION, Part IV (2005), availableat

http://hrw.org/reports/2005/usO905/.

1196

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:1169

The contrast between decision making by the executive alone and joint executivelegislative decision making is also illustrated in the current controversy over the NSA
surveillance program. That program was devised in secret within the executive branch
and for years was operated with no effective knowledge or oversight by, let alone
meaningful input from, Congress. 48 As a result, the public had no input as to the
program. It is sometimes said that in the context of the array of threats to national
security that are referred to as the War on Terror, there is a trade-off to be made
between liberty and security. That may be so, but the Constitution counsels that this is
precisely the sort of fundamental decision that is to be made through deliberation by
accountable governmental process.
The specific statutory question raised by the NSA surveillance program is whether
the surveillance must comply with the warrant procedures of FISA, or whether the
AUMF creates an exception to FISA. The rights/structure dichotomy might come out
either way.' 49 The NSA surveillance program implicates individual rights, yet the
AUMF does not contain anything like a clear statement authorizing the executive
branch to engage in warrantless wiretapping even of international communications. On
the other hand, deference to the President's interpretation of his own power supports
the validity of the program--or at least counsels interpretive restraint against declaring
the program to be illegal. The rights/structure dichotomy's war with itself ought to
serve as a strong caution against it. But there is a deeper problem. Whether one comes
down on the side of individual rights or on the side of presidential power, an approach
that focuses only on individual rights and presidential power simply overlooks the role
of Congress and all the important values that role supports. Thus, it may be that the
public supports warrantless surveillance as a reasonable liberty trade-off, but that is
beside the point. 50 Reading a statute to allow the President to make the decision alone
and in secret, without the participation of Congress, conflicts with the fundamental
commitments of our constitutional structure. These commitments are missing from the
rights/structure dichotomy.

148. A small group of congressional leaders was personally briefed about the highly
classified program, but they were not allowed to discuss it with anyone, including their own
staffs. Senator Jay Rockefeller was left to handwrite a note to the President expressing his
concerns, for want of the benefit of staff research or even secretarial assistance.
149. As, in fact, have its proponents. Professor Curtis Bradley signed a letter by prominent
scholars and former executive officials challenging the validity of the NSA surveillance
program. See Beth Nolan et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress,N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Feb.
9, 2006), availableat http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650. Professor Sunstein, on the other
hand, has defended the program. See Postings of Cass Sunstein, Presidential Wiretapping, to
The Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2005/12presidentialwi.html#more
(Dec. 19, 2005, 14:52 EST).
150. Current data on this issue presents a mixed picture. See Adam Nagoumey & Janet
Elder, New Poll FindsMixed Supportfor Wiretaps,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,2006, at Al, available

at http://www.nytimes.com2006/01/27/politics/27poll.html?hp&ex=l138338000&en=34b
99413dcd9a25e&ei=5094&partner=homepage.
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CONCLUSION

It is tempting to say, particularly in the statutory realm, that if Congress means to
constrain the President, it should say so specifically rather than relying on the Court to
craft (or concoct, to use a more pejorative label) limits. It is neither possible nor
desirable for Congress to legislate more specifically. Imagine the situation facing
Congress on September 18, 2001. We knew very little, yet the need to authorize the
President was great and the importance of not tying the President's hands was obvious.
It is possible to read the statute as therefore giving the President whatever he wants; it
is also possible to regard it as authorizing broad latitude in the response to the specific
events of September 11 th and its immediate aftermath, leaving the further elaboration
of scope and limits to later development by the legal process. The courts are an
important actor but they are only one. The approach to interpretation should leave
room for each branch meaningfully to play its role in this process. Deference prevents
this process from developing and leaves all power in the President. Scrutiny, on the
other hand, introduces the courts and allows them to safeguard our civil rights and
liberties, yet it also allows the political branches together to play the primary role of
setting and pursuing policy.

